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1.  Introduction 
 
  The European Community Treaty 
has  established  the  ECB  as  a 
specialized, independent organization for 
conducting  monetary  policy  and 
performing related functions. To this end, 
the  ECB  has  been  given  a  legal 
personality  of  its  own,  with  its  own 
decision-making  bodies  and  powers.  Its 
organization as a central bank responds 
to the specific nature of monetary policy, 
i.e.  a  public  policy  function  that  is 
implemented  mainly  by  financial  market 
operations. 
  The  ECB  has  legal  personality 
under Article 107(2) of the EC Treaty and 
enjoys the most extensive legal capacity 
accorded  to  legal  persons  under  the 
respective national law of each Member 
State under Article 9.1 of the Statute of 
the  ESCB.  It  may  therefore  acquire  or 
dispose  of  movable  and  immovable 
property  and  be  party  to  legal 
proceedings. In addition, the ECB enjoys 
those privileges and immunities that are 
necessary  for  the  performance  of  its 
tasks, under the conditions laid down in 
the  Protocol  on  the  privileges  and 
immunities of the European Communities 
of 8 April 1965. 
  As  a  legal  person  under  public 
international law, the ECB is in a position 
to,  among  other  things,  conclude 
international  agreements  in  matters 
relating  to  its  field  of  competence  and 
participate  in  the  work  of  international 
organizations  such  as  the  International 
Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  the  Bank  for 
International  Settlements  (BIS)  and  the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). 
  Although  performing  a  policy 
function under the EC Treaty the ECB is 
not a Community institution in the proper 
meaning of the term. It is not referred to 
in  Article  7  of  the  EC  Treaty  which 
establishes  the  five  institutions  of  the 
Community:  the  European  Parliament, 
the  Council,  the  European  Commission, 
the  Court  of  Justice  and  the  Court  of 
Auditors. These institutions are entrusted 
with  the  broad  mandate  of  carrying  out 
the  tasks  of  the  Community  within  the 
limits of the powers conferred upon them 
by the Treaty. Instead, the legal basis of 
the ESCB and the ECB is provided for in 
a separate article (Article 8 of the Treaty). 
This underpins the specific status of the 
ECB  within  the  overall  context  of  the 
European Community, sets it apart from 
the  other  institutions  and  their  auxiliary 
bodies and limits its activities to a clearly 
defined special task. 
  As  an  organization  created  by 
the EC Treaty, the ECB enjoys genuine 
powers.  These  powers  have  not  been 
delegated by the Community institutions; 
they  are  genuine  powers  given  to  the 
ECB  by  the  EC  Treaty.  This  feature 
distinguishes  the  ECB  from  the  various 
decentralized  agencies  of  the 
Community,  which  possess  their  own 
legal  personality  but  have  competences 
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2. The importance of BCE’s 
independence 
 
  A cornerstone of monetary order 
in the euro area is the independence of 
the ECB and euro area National Central 
Banks  (NCBs)  from  political  influence. 
This  independence  has  been  enshrined 
in both the EC Treaty and the Statute of 
the  ESCB,  rather  than  in  secondary 
legislation,  and  thus  has  “constitutional” 
status. 
  The  ECBs  independence  is  a 
corollary  to  its  primary  objective  of 
maintaining  price  stability  and  its 
exclusive  competence  for  the  monetary 
policy  and  related  functions  in  the  euro 
area. The ECB needs to be shielded from 
all  types  of  influence  that  might  be 
adverse to the achievement of its primary 
objective. An independent central bank is 
not only in a better position to pursue the 
primary  objective  of  price  stability;  it  is 
also perceived by the public to be more 
credible  than  a  central  bank  which  is  a 
dependent  on  a  government.  Indeed, 
governments  have  to  pursue  many 
objectives and are not perceived by the 
financial markets and the general public 
to always give priority to the objective of 
price stability where there is a conflict of 
objectives. 
  The independence of the ECB is 
not therefore an end in itself, but rather 
an indispensable element of a monetary 
order that gives priority to the objective of 
price stability. 
  
a) Institutional independence  
  Article  108  is  the  key  Treaty 
provision  establishing  the  independence 
of  the  ECB.    First  sentence  states 
explicitly  that,  “when  exercising  their 
powers and carrying out their tasks and 
duties, neither the ECB nor an NCB nor 
any  member  of  their  decision-making 
bodies  shall  seek  or  take  instructions 
from  Community  institutions  or  bodies, 
from any government of a Member State 
or from any other body”. The wording of 
Article 108 makes it illegal to accept or 
seek  instructions  from  any  body,  be  it 
public or private, national or international, 
with  the  emphasis  on  the  term 
“instruction”.  Article  108  does  not 
preclude seeking relevant information or 
dialoguing  with  the  aforementioned 
bodies. 
  The  prohibition  on  the 
acceptance  of  instructions  is 
complemented  by  a  self  commitment  of 
the  Community  institutions  and  bodies 
and  the  governments  of  the  Member 
States. The second sentence states that 
these bodies “have undertaken to respect 
this principle and not to seek to influence 
the  members  of  the  decision-making 
bodies of the ECB or of the NCBs in the 
performance  of  their  tasks.”  Thus,  they 
are obliged to abstain from attempting to 
give  instructions  to  the  members  of  the 
decision-making bodies of the ECB and 
the NCBs and to abstain from influencing 
them. 
 
b) Legal independence 
  The  ECB  and  NCBs  enjoy  their 
own  legal  personality,  which  is  a 
prerequisite for the independence of the 
members  of  the  Eurosystem.  For  the 
ECB,  legal  independence  includes  the 
right to bring actions before the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) in order to uphold 
its prerogatives if they are impaired by a 
Community institution or Member State. 
 
c) Personal independence  
  To  substantiate  the  institutional 
independence,  the  Statute  protects  the 
personal  independence  of  the  members 
of  the  ECB’s  decision-making  bodies.  It 
stipulates,  in  particular,  relatively  long 
fixed terms of office: 
  • a minimum term of office of five 
years  for  the  NCB  governors,  which  is 
renewable; 
  • a non-renewable term of office 
of  eight  years  for  the  members  of  the 
Executive Board. 
  A member of the ECBs decision-
making bodies may not be dismissed in a 
discretionary  manner  on  the  grounds  of 
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members  may  only  be  removed  from 
office if they become unable to fulfill the 
conditions  required  for  the  performance 
of their duties or if they are found guilty of 
serious  misconduct.  In  such  cases,  the 
Governing  Council  or  the  Executive 
Board may apply to the ECJ to have the 
member  of  the  Executive  Board 
compulsorily  retired  (Article  11.4  of  the 
Statute  of  the  ESCB).  In  the  same 
circumstances, an NCB governor may be 
relieved  from  office  by  the  competent 
national  authority  in  line  with  the 
procedures  specified  in  the  statute  of 
their respective NCB.  
  However,  the  governor 
concerned or the Governing Council may 
refer the matter to the Court, which has 
jurisdiction in such cases (Article 14.2 of 
the Statute of the ESCB). The statutes of 
the NCBs (as amended in line with Article 
109  of  the  EC  Treaty)  extend  the 
protection  against  discretionary 
dismissals  to  the  other  members  of  the 
NCBs’ decision-making bodies; however, 
the other members do not enjoy the right 
to refer the matter to the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ). 
 
d) Financial independence  
  The  ECB  and  the  NCBs  have 
their own financial resources and income 
and enjoy organizational autonomy. Their 
financial  and  organizational  autonomy 
enables  the  Eurosystem  to  perform  its 
tasks as required. 
  The  capital  of  the  ECB  is 
subscribed  and  paid  up  by  the  NCBs. 
The  ECB  has  its  own  budget, 
independent  from  that  of  the  EU.  The 
Statute  also  allows  the  ECB  to  adopt 
autonomously  the  conditions  of 
employment for its staff and to organize 
its internal structure as it sees fit. 
  In  addition,  as  a  supranational 
organization,  the  ECB  enjoys  in  the 
territories  of  the  Member  States  the 
privileges  and  immunities  that  are 
necessary  for  the  performance  of  its 
tasks. Chapter 1 of the Protocol  on the 
privileges  and  immunities  of  the 
European  Communities  of  8  April  1965 
guarantees, among other things, that the 
premises  and  archives  of  the  ECB  are 
inviolable and that its property and assets 
are intangible. The Protocol states further 
that  these  must  not  be  subject  to  any 
administrative  or  legal  measure  of 
constraint without the authorization of the 
ECJ. 
  As  regards  the  NCBs’  financial 
and  budgetary  autonomy  and  the 
autonomy  of  their  staff,  the  Member 
States  have  a  certain  influence  over 
NCBs’  budgets  and  the  distribution  of 
profits and staffing, be it as (sometimes 
sole) shareholder of their respective NCB 
or as national legislator. However, in line 
with  the  statutes  of  the  NCBs,  the 
Member States’ rights are subject to the 
proviso that their exercise is not allowed 
to  impede  on  the  NCBs’  capacity  to 
perform  their  Eurosystem-related 
functions. 
 
3. The efficiency of central bank 
transparency 
 
  In  August  2003  the  Executive 
Board  adopted  the  ECB’s  mission 
statement reflecting its aims and position 
within  the  Eurosystem.  “The  European 
Central  Bank  and  the  national  central 
banks  together  constitute  the 
Eurosystem, the central banking system 
of the euro area. The  main objective of 
the  Eurosystem  is  to  maintain  price 
stability:  safeguarding  the  value  of  the 
euro. We at the European Central Bank 
are  committed  to  performing  all  central 
bank tasks entrusted to us effectively. In 
so doing, we strive for the highest level of 
integrity,  competence,  efficiency  and 
transparency.” 
  The  first  part  of  the  mission 
statement  emphasizes  the  ECB’s  vital 
relationship  with  the  NCBs  of  the  euro 
area  and  the  primary  objective  of  the 
Eurosystem.  The  second  part  stresses 
the ECB’s commitment to performing its 
tasks  in  an  effective  manner,  and  the 
values which the staff and management 
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important  for  the  performance  of  their 
duties.  The  values  of  integrity, 
competence, efficiency and transparency 
were  given  particular  prominence  in  an 
ECB  staff  survey,  the  results  of  which 
served as direct input for the formulation 
of the mission statement. 
  These values are reflected in the 
way in which the ECB has organized its 
internal  structure  and  working 
procedures.  These  structural  and 
procedural  features  are  not  static  but 
continually  evolving  with  a  view  to 
developing  the  best  practices  and 
standards. Thus, in its start-up phase, the 
ECB’s  priorities  were  to  establish  its 
functions and to introduce the euro. Now 
that  these  initial  goals  have  been 
successfully realized, the ECB has more 
recently  increased  its  focus  to 
strengthening  its  internal  organization 
and human resources strategy. 
  In  2005,  the  Governing  Council 
of  the  ECB  agreed  on  a  mission 
statement for the Eurosystem, as well as 
on  a  set  of  common  values  and 
organizational  principles  to  promote  a 
shared identity and successful team work 
among  all  members  of  the  Eurosystem. 
The  six  common  values  agreed  for  the 
ECB are: competence, effectiveness and 
efficiency,  integrity,  team  spirit, 
transparency  and  accountability,  and 
working  for  Europe.  The  nine 
organizational  principles  include: 
participation,  cooperation,  transparency 
and  accountability,  distinguishing 
Eurosystem  activities,  cohesion  and 
unity,  exchange  of  resources, 
effectiveness  and  efficiency  in  decision 
making,  cost  efficiency,  measurement 
and  methodology,  as  well  as  exploit 
synergies and avoid duplications. 
  Committee  chairpersons  also 
seek  to  ensure  that  an  atmosphere  of 
trust  prevails  among  committee 
members,  and  aim  to  foster  a 
participatory team spirit. In line  with the 
aims  of  the  Eurosystem’s  mission 
statement,  the  committee  structure 
contributes  to  good  governance  and 
helps the Eurosystem to perform its tasks 
effectively  and  efficiently  in  a  spirit  of 
cooperation  and  teamwork.  In  this 
regard,  it  is  important  to  pursue  an 
approach  that  clearly  defines  roles  and 
responsibilities  for  all  members  of  the 
Eurosystem. 
 
4. Accountability – a way to gain 
legitimacy 
 
  Accountability  is  a  basic 
precondition  for  democratic  legitimacy 
and  a  core  element  of  democratic 
structures.  In  a  democracy,  all  power 
emanates  from  its  citizens  and  all 
decisions  that  bind  and  affect  a 
community have to be legitimized by the 
will of the electorate. Thus, public policy 
decisions  are  legitimate  if  they  are  the 
direct or indirect expression of that will – 
this  is  often  referred  to  as  “input 
legitimacy” or “legitimacy by procedure” – 
or if they meet the justified expectations 
and  needs  of  the  citizens  –  a  notion 
referred  to  as  “output  legitimacy”  or 
“legitimacy by result”. 
  As  an  organization  established 
by the EC Treaty, which was signed and 
ratified  by  all  Member  States  in 
accordance  with  their  constitutional 
requirements,  the  ECB  enjoys  “input 
legitimacy”.  The  EU  Member  States 
(acting  through  their  elected 
representatives)  took  a  sovereign 
decision  to  transfer  responsibility  for 
monetary policy and the related tasks to 
a  new  Community  organization  and  to 
endow it with independence from political 
interference.  Competency  for  monetary 
policy is transferred within the limits and 
the conditions of a mandate which clearly 
defines the objective of monetary policy 
and  thus  limits  the  amount  of  legally 
permitted  discretion  that  the  decision 
making  bodies  of  the  ECB  can  use  in 
conducting monetary policy. 
  Further  “input  legitimacy”  is 
derived from the procedure for appointing 
the  members  of  the  ECB’s  decision 
making bodies; they are all appointed by 
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representatives of the Member States. As 
already  stated,  Executive  Board 
members  are  appointed  by  common 
accord of the Member States at the level 
of  the  Heads  of  State  or  Government 
(after  consultation  of  the  European 
Parliament);  the  other  members  of  the 
Governing Council are appointed by their 
respective national authorities in line with 
prevailing procedures. 
  However,  the  ECB  can  also 
derive “output legitimacy” by successfully 
performing the tasks entrusted to it. The 
conduct  of  monetary  policy  and  the 
performance  of  other  tasks  have  been 
made  subject  to  independent  decision 
making  for  a  specific  purpose,  i.e. 
maintaining  price  stability  in  the  euro 
area.  The  experience  of  a  number  of 
central banks in the post-war period has 
shown  that  this  objective  can  be  best 
achieved  by  having  an  independent 
central bank that acts within a clear and 
binding mandate. In this way, despite its 
intentional  distance  from  the  normal 
political process, an independent central 
bank can enjoy full output legitimacy. 
  In  addition,  the  legitimacy  of 
independent  central  banks  rests  on  a 
comprehensive  framework  for  holding 
them  accountable.  Independence  and 
accountability are two sides of the same 
coin.  Thus,  the  ECB  is  called  on  to 
explain  and  justify  to  the  European 
citizens and their elected representatives 
how it uses the powers and prerogatives 
it has been entrusted with. 
  The  term  “accountability”  refers 
to  a  concept  deeply  rooted  in  the 
democratic  and  institutional  conventions 
of  English-speaking  countries.  In  a 
European  context,  the  notion  of  “being 
accountable”  is  understood  to  mean 
being  held  responsible  for  one’s 
decisions and actions and being required 
to justify and explain them. 
  This  concept  necessarily  refers 
to  an  ex  post  justification  and 
explanation. Indeed, if any political body 
– such as a parliament or government – 
were  able  to  intervene  or  influence 
directly  the  policy-making  of  the  central 
bank, they would actually be taking part 
in the decision-making process itself and 
hence would share the responsibility for 
the policy outcomes. This would not only 
contradict the independent status of the 
central bank, but it would also render the 
concept of accountability meaningless. 
  To a large extent, accountability 
goes  hand  in  hand  with  transparency. 
Transparency  means  not  only  releasing 
information,  but  also  structuring  that 
information in such a way that the public 
can  understand  it.  Transparency  thus 
facilitates  the  process  of  holding  an 
independent  central  bank  accountable. 
The  Treaty  provisions  for  holding  the 
ECB accountable and the practices and 
procedures  established  over  the  years 
have  been  adapted  to  the  specific 
political,  economic  and  institutional 
circumstances  in  which  the  ECB 
operates.  The  ECB  is  a  supranational 
central bank that carries out its tasks for 
the  multi-country  economy  of  the  euro 
area;  its  audience  is  not  genuinely 
European,  but  rather  multinational.  The 
ECB  has  also  been  given  a  specific 
institutional  structure  with  the  ex  officio 
participation of the NCB governors in its 
decision-making. 
  Despite  institutional  and  political 
differences,  the  provisions  and 
procedures  for  holding  the  ECB 
accountable  ensure  that  the  ECB  fulfils 
its  accountability  obligations  no  less 
effectively  and  adequately  than  a 





  In  designing  a  blueprint  for  the 
Eurosystem,  it  was  also  important  to 
incorporate  a  number  of  critical 
components  for  the  success  of  central 
banking, as identified by the experience 
of central banks with a strong record in 
delivering  price  stability.  We  briefly 
review several – but by no means all – of 
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  a.  Modern  monetary  theory  has 
flagged  the  critical  role  of  central  bank 
independence.  It  is  widely  seen  as  a 
prerequisite for the successful pursuit of 
price  stability.  Central  bank 
independence  is  consistent  with  the 
existence  of  a  decentralized  operational 
framework for monetary policy, whereby 
decisions on a single short-term interest 
rate  are  made  centrally,  and  it  also 
leaves scope for a central bank to evolve 
over  time.  It  should  have,  and  has  in 
most  cases,  constitutional  rank.  The 
studies  on  central  bank  independence 
were influential in that more attention was 
devoted  to  the  issue  in  political  cycles. 
Over past decades far-reaching reforms 
of  monetary  constitutions  around  the 
world  aiming  at  increasing  central  bank 
independence have been undertaken. All 
euro  area  NCBs  were  made  fully 
independent at the time of Stage One of 
EMU.  
  b.  Central  banks  should  have  a 
clear  policy  goal  based  on  a 
constitutional  mandate.  Central  bank 
mandates have evolved over time. Over 
the last two decades, the conclusion that 
has emerged from the academic debate, 
and  that  is  widely  shared  by  policy 
makers, is that focusing monetary policy 
on  the  goal  of  price  stability  is  its  best 
possible  assignment,  reflecting  the 
comparative  advantages  between  policy 
instruments and policy objectives. Actual 
practices  or  operational  concepts  may, 
however,  vary  somewhat  across  major 
industrial countries. 
  c. Most central banks around the 
world  have  accepted  the  importance  of 
high standards in terms of transparency 
and clarity. Transparency is an attribute 
with  several  facets  touching  upon  the 
diverse  actions  (and  activities)  of  the 
Eurosystem.  Its  aim  is  to  render 
monetary  policy  more  effective  by 
ensuring that the public understands the 
monetary policy objective, as well as the 
preparation  and  decision-making 
processes  behind  it.  However, 
transparency  is  not  an  end  in  itself 
Modern central banks have chosen to be 
accountable to citizens for their monetary 
policy.  This  helps  monetary  policy  to 
better  anchor  inflation  expectations  and 
enhance  its  credibility.  Accountability  is 
the  legal  and  political  obligation  of  a 
central  bank  to  explain  and  justify  its 
decisions  to  citizens  and  their  elected 
representatives. High standards in terms 
of  accountability  provide  the  necessary 
checks and balances for an independent 
central bank that performs its tasks in a 
democratic  society.  The  process  of 
accountability requires the existence of a 
binding mandate against which a central 
bank’s  actions  can  be  assessed. 
Accountability normally takes the form of 
a  dialogue  that  involves  elected 
representatives  (i.e.  Parliament, 
Government) and the central bank. In a 
wider  sense,  accountability  includes  a 
broad  range  of  official  communications 
by the central bank in which it explains to 
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